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Chapter 9
Moral Responsibility and the Justification 
of Policies to Preserve Antimicrobial 
Effectiveness
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Abstract Restrictive policies that limit antimicrobial consumption, including ther-
apeutically justified use, might be necessary to tackle the problem of antimicrobial 
resistance. We argue that such policies would be ethically justified when forgoing 
antimicrobials constitutes a form of easy rescue for an individual. These are cases 
of mild and self-limiting infections in otherwise healthy patients whose overall 
health is not significantly compromised by the infection. In such cases, restrictive 
policies would be ethically justified because they would coerce individuals into ful-
filling a moral obligation they independently have. However, to ensure that such 
justification is the strongest possible, states also have the responsibility to ensure 
that forgoing antimicrobials is as easy as possible for patients by implementing 
adequate compensation measures.
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9.1  The Problem of Antimicrobial Resistance
When Alexander Fleming was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1945, he 
warned in his acceptance speech of the risk that some bacteria could develop resis-
tance to penicillin, which he had discovered 17 years earlier. It cannot be overstated 
how longsighted Fleming was. Today, “bacteria are resistant to nearly all antibiotics 
that were earlier active against them” (Herrmann and Laxminarayan 2010, p. 4.2), 
and “700,000 people die of resistant infections every year” (O’Neill 2016, p. 4). As 
estimated by the Review on Antimicrobial Resistance commissioned by the UK 
government, “by 2050 10 million lives a year are at risk due to drug resistant infec-
tions, as are 100 trillion USD of economic output” (O’Neill 2016). Examples of 
diseases associated with antimicrobial resistance (AMR) include tuberculosis, gon-
orrhoea, typhoid fever, and group A streptococcus (Van der Velden et al. 2013). The 
problem of AMR has been framed by some in terms of a “slowly emerging disaster” 
(Littmann and Viens 2015) and of a “global health security issue” (Balasegaram 
et al. 2015).
AMR is a naturally occurring phenomenon: microbes naturally tend to adapt to 
antimicrobials and develop resistance. However, AMR is accelerated by human 
behaviour (Jamrozik and Selgelid 2019), and particularly the use and abuse of anti-
microbials, both in livestock (Anomaly 2019; Giubilini et al. 2017; O’Neill 2015; 
Anomaly 2009) and in humans (O’Neill 2016). This paper is focussed on AMR 
caused by human consumption of antimicrobials, and therefore on the human factor 
in the development of AMR. There is a positive correlation between antimicrobial 
resistance rates and antimicrobial consumption in humans (Van der Velden et al. 
2013, pp. 318–19). In fact, in the case of antibiotics, it is now widely accepted that 
“the use of antibiotics is the single most important factor leading to antibiotic resis-
tance around the world: simply using antibiotics creates resistance” (CDC, About 
antimicrobial resistance), even when antibiotic use is medically indicated to treat 
infections (which is what makes AMR a particularly difficult ethical issue). Thus, 
the paradox of antibiotic and certain other kind of antimicrobial consumption is that 
while certain antimicrobials can be beneficial to individuals, their use also poses a 
threat to public health, to the lives of millions of people, and to the world economy. 
If they are not used more wisely than they currently are, i.e. if their consumption is 
not reduced, we might face a “post antibiotic” era (Alanis 2005; WHO 2014) char-
acterized by two undesirable outcomes. First, we might no longer have effective 
means of treating severe infections. Second, medicine’s achievements that require 
effective antibiotics, such as organ transplantation, cancer chemotherapy, and major 
surgery, might no longer be available (WHO, Antimicrobial resistance).
To be sure, the problem of reducing antibiotic and certain type of antimicrobial 
consumption mainly concerns those countries with easy access to and massive con-
sumption of antimicrobials. These are mainly high-income countries (HICs). The 
consumption rate of antimicrobials in most low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs), although it increased dramatically in recent years, remains much lower 
than that in HICs, and in many LMICs the burden of infectious disease still out-
weighs the burden of resistance; the increase in consumption in such countries 
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ought to be closely monitored, but drastic measures to reduce antibiotic consump-
tion need to be implemented primarily in HICs (Klein et al. 2018). Reduction of 
therapeutically justified antimicrobial consumption in LMICs for conservation pur-
poses might have undesirable outcomes, especially in those countries where the 
level of public health is already poor. There might be exceptions, of course; for 
instance, India is a lower-income country and one of the major contributors to resis-
tance through very high consumption rates (Kumar et al. 2013; WHO India 2018), 
so perhaps significant restrictions on antibiotic access  – that is, restrictions that 
apply also to therapeutically justified use – should be implemented in such context 
as well. However, to make our arguments the least controversial possible, we take 
them to apply only to HICs where a good level of public health might allow leaving 
certain mild and self-limiting infections untreated without posing significant costs 
on patients.
This paper is focussed on two often neglected aspects of the problem of AMR, 
namely on the individual moral obligations with regard to antimicrobial consump-
tion and on the type of justification that health authorities could and should offer for 
restricting access to antimicrobials in order to preserve antimicrobial effectiveness. 
As we will argue in Sect. 9.3, these two aspects are closely related: the state has an 
obligation to provide the strongest justification possible for restrictive interventions 
aimed at limiting antimicrobial consumption, and the strongest justification is one 
based on the existence of an individual moral obligation to forgo antimicrobials, 
perhaps (as we will suggest in Sect. 9.4) even in case of mild self-limiting infections 
that do not significantly risk worsening the individual’s general health. The fact that 
even justified use of antimicrobials, i.e. the use that is medically necessary to treat 
infections (as opposed to unjustified use, e.g. when antibiotics are prescribed for 
viral infections, a practice that is not uncommon unfortunately), contributes to anti-
microbial resistance determines a moral conflict between individual interest and 
collective interest that might require individuals to make sacrifices for the sake of 
the common good.
Such moral conflict gives rise to a “tragedy of the commons” scenario (Hollis 
and Maybarduk 2015), which will be presented in Sect. 9.2: we will argue, follow-
ing Garrett Hardin, that the tragedy of the commons has an ethical solution, which 
will be presented in Sect. 9.4, where we will argue that there is a moral obligation 
to contribute to the preservation of the common good of antimicrobial effectiveness 
which might entail a moral obligation not to use antimicrobials in some cases of 
mild, self-limiting infections, provided that certain conditions obtain and that the 
state takes all the measures that are necessary to ensure that forgoing antimicrobials 
in those cases approximates a form of “easy rescue”.
Thus, in Sect. 9.4 we will draw the policy implications of this ethical solution to 
the tragedy of the commons: the moral obligation to sometimes forgo antimicrobi-
als, grounded in a duty of easy rescue, strengthens the justification for state inter-
ventions that prohibit or discourage the use of antimicrobials in certain cases. Since 
states should be able to provide the strongest justification possible for implementing 
restrictive policies that discourage or prohibit antimicrobial consumption, appeal to 
individual moral obligations to sometimes forgo antimicrobials has a political 
weight in terms of justification of state-imposed restrictions on antimicrobial use.
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However, as we will suggest in conclusion of Sect. 9.4, the moral obligation of 
the state to provide the strongest justification possible for restricting access to anti-
microbials implies an obligation on the state to ensure that forgoing antimicrobials 
does represent a form of easy rescue, i.e. that individuals bear as small a cost as 
possible for leaving certain infections untreated with antimicrobials (assuming this 
measure is necessary). This means, in practice, that the state has moral obligations 
towards individuals who are requested to forgo antimicrobial for the sake of the col-
lective good, such as the obligation to provide enhanced medical follow up and to 
adequately compensate, financially or in other ways (e.g. higher priorities on wait-
ing lists for other medical treatments), these individuals.
9.2  Public Goods, Tragedy of the Commons, and Policies 
to Address Antimicrobial Resistance
It has been claimed that “if effective antibiotics are seen as a public good, their 
overuse may be likened to the tragedy of the commons scenario” (Littmann and 
Viens 2015, p. 214). This statement is not entirely correct in the way the notion of 
‘public good’ is applied. As we are going to see in this section, antibiotic and more 
generally antimicrobial effectiveness shares an essential feature with common 
goods or common pool resources, rather than with public goods. Let’s see more in 
detail what this terminology means when the concepts of “public goods” and of 
“common goods” are applied to the case of antimicrobial effectiveness.
Some benefits associated with antimicrobial effectiveness can certainly be con-
sidered public goods. These include freedom from infectious diseases (Selgelid 
2007, p. 226), the containment of infectious diseases (Woodward and Smith 2003, 
p. 10), or the reduced risk of infection by a resistant disease (Smith and Coast 2003, 
p. 78). These benefits are public goods in the technical sense of the term: they are 
non-excludable, in the sense that people cannot be excluded from benefitting from 
them; and they are non-rivalrous, in the sense that the fact that a person benefits 
from them does not affect the way and the extent to which others benefit as well 
(Cowen 2008). More precisely, freedom from infectious diseases, infectious disease 
containment, and the reduced risk of infection can be conceived as global public 
goods, i.e. goods “exhibiting a significant degree of publicness (i.e. non- excludability 
and non-rivalry) across national boundaries” (Woodward and Smith 2003, p, 8).
Effective antimicrobials are the means through which such public goods are pre-
served. But antimicrobial effectiveness is a common good rather than a public good 
because antimicrobial effectiveness is rivalrous in consumption, in virtue of what 
Anne Schwenkenbecher in a chapter of this volume calls “the antimicrobial foot-
print” of antimicrobial consumptions: “simply using antibiotics [or other antimicro-
bials] creates resistance” (CDC, About Antimicrobial resistance) and “more 
consumption of antibiotics directly leads to more resistance” (O’Neill 2016, p. 17), 
regardless of whether antimicrobial use is therapeutically justified or not. The use of 
the resource of antimicrobial effectiveness through antimicrobial consumption erodes 
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the resource and therefore diminishes its availability. As put by Jonny Anomaly, 
“individually rational choices produce substantial social costs by creating reservoirs 
of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in human hosts and more generally in our shared 
microbial environment” (Anomaly 2013, p. 753). It is important to point out that, 
while antimicrobial use might benefit individuals in the short term, this is not neces-
sarily the case in the long term: individuals can incur a portion of the costs associated 
with antimicrobial resistance (Anomaly 2013, p. 752). For example, the individual 
who takes antibiotics can become a carrier of resistant bacteria, which means that the 
individual is at greater risk in case of subsequent infections (Cars et al. 2008).
It has been observed that the effectiveness of antimicrobials can “be modelled as 
a natural resource in much the same way as are fish, tree, oil, and other resources” 
(Herrmann and Laxminarayan 2010, p. 4.3). According to John Conly, for example,
antimicrobial resistance may be likened to [the] overfishing scenario, to cattle overgrazing 
the grass in the commons or to deforestation on Easter Island, which led to population dying 
out. Antimicrobial resistance is a consequence of continued overuse of antibiotics com-
bined with the constant growth of resistance overtime. (WHO 2010)
Typically, consumption of natural resources determines a ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’ scenario (Ostrom et al. 1999,). Garrett Hardin first described the “tragedy of 
the commons” in an article he published in Science (Hardin 1968). Hardin illustrated 
the problem through the example of a commons to which some herdsmen have access. 
The tragedy occurs when many herdsmen, acting merely out of self-interest, have 
their cattle overgraze the commons, thus eroding the resource (Hardin 1968, p. 1244). 
Particularly in a context of growing population, all herdsmen acting in the same way 
deplete the common good. In the context of antimicrobial effectiveness, the same 
problem arises (Hollis and Maybarduk 2015). As Jonny Anomaly put it, “the benefits 
of [antibiotic] use are borne by the individual, the costs are socialised, and the conse-
quent harm is the product of many independent actions” (Anomaly 2013, p. 752).
According to Hardin, one characteristic of a tragedy of the commons is the fact 
that there is no “technical” solution to the problem, meaning that there is no solution 
“that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding 
little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality” (Hardin 
1968, p. 1243). On the contrary, Hardin argued, the solution requires a “fundamen-
tal extension” of our morality (Hardin 1968, p. 1243), i.e. acting in view of protect-
ing the public interest rather than in a merely self-interested way.
However, Hardin seemed to be sceptical about the possibility that such an exten-
sion of morality could occur, at least without some external coercive intervention 
(which on most accounts of morality would arguably undermine the authentically 
“moral” nature of the change invoked). He believed that the best way to solve a 
tragedy of the commons is through some degree of “mutually agreed upon” coer-
cion (Hardin 1968, p. 1247), for example in the form of taxation that would allow to 
internalize the negative externalities of individual consumption.1
1 Another solution Hardin proposed is the privatization of the commons (Hardin 1968, p. 1245), 
which in the case of antimicrobials might consist in “extending the period of exclusivity, possibly 
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And indeed, some have suggested that the negative externalities of antimicrobial 
use could be internalised through the introduction of user fees or consumption taxes 
(Littmann and Viens 2015; Anomaly 2013; Herrmann and Laxminarayan 2010). 
Internalization is typically achieved by “taxing negative externalities (…) at a rate 
that would offset the social cost of the activities that generate the externalities, and 
then (ideally) using the revenues from the tax to fund socially useful projects” 
(Anomaly 2009, p. 433). The idea behind the concept of internalization is that it is 
those who are responsible for a negative externality that should bear the cost for it.
However, it might not be possible to fully internalise the collective cost of anti-
microbial consumption and to disincentivize consumers through a tax: selection for 
AMR will probably continue to occur in spite of the tax and in spite of the invest-
ment of the revenue in strategies to contain AMR such as research on new antimi-
crobials. For this reason, it has been suggested that we might need at some point to 
introduce policies to restrict antimicrobial use only to the most serious infections, 
i.e. that it might be necessary to prevent, if necessary through legal prohibition, their 
use in the case of milder self-limiting infections (Foster and Grundmann 2006, 
p. 179). We will return to this point in Sect. 9.4.
Policies might therefore aim to disincentivize individuals from using antimicro-
bials, in the case of taxation; or they might coercively impose restrictions on antimi-
crobial use, in the case of outright prohibition of antimicrobial use in certain 
circumstances. As said before, we are interested here not so much in determining 
which policies would be more effective and ethically acceptable. Thus, we do not 
intend to provide arguments for or against taxation of antibiotics or restrictions on 
their use. Rather, we are interested in what justification an authority might offer for 
implementing restrictive policies, whatever form they take. While such policies 
might be justified by considerations of public interest, it is important that the type of 
justification that a state can provide for interventions that limit or discourage anti-
microbial use be the strongest justification possible, given that such interventions 
might require individuals to sacrifice some significant personal interest, such as the 
interest in accessing effective health care, for the sake of the common good. As we 
are going to argue in the next section, considerations about the morality of individ-
ual choices regarding antimicrobial consumption can strengthen the justification for 
such policies.
9.3  Morality and Antimicrobial Consumption
Restrictive and coercive interventions might be efficacious at protecting the com-
mon goods associated with AMR containment and in preserving the common good 
of antimicrobial effectiveness. However, the “tragedy of the commons” scenario 
indefinitely” of the patents, thus giving “the patentee the ability to charge high prices and thus 
indirectly restrain overuse by some users” (Hollis and Maybarduk 2015, p. 33).
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which preservation of antimicrobial effectiveness gives rise to suggests that there is 
an independent ethical dimension to the problem of AMR. In this section we will 
explain why discussing such an independent ethical dimension is important from a 
political point of view, i.e. in view of justifying coercive policies aimed at restricting 
antimicrobial use.
Establishing an independent moral responsibility to make a more appropriate use 
of antimicrobials would make the justification that a state could provide for policies 
that restrict or discourage antimicrobial use the strongest possible. And, arguably, 
the state does have a duty to provide individuals with the strongest justification pos-
sible for implementing policies that restrict or discourage a treatment that is in the 
individuals’ best interest, as is often the case with antimicrobials.
Restrictive policies might be justified in light of a state’s duty to protect certain 
common goods and public goods, such as the public goods associated with AMR 
containment. These possible interventions range from those that are minimally 
intrusive to those that more substantially infringe rights or important interests of 
individuals. Thus, at one end of the spectrum we find policies such as information 
campaigns, nudging, or incentivisation of certain pro-social behaviours; and at the 
other end we find more restrictive policies such as taxation and compulsion. In all 
such cases, the authority enforcing such policies should be able to provide the stron-
gest justification possible for its interventions, but the more restrictive the policies 
become, the more difficult it is for the authority to meet such requirement. A state’s 
duty to protect public goods and common goods by itself does not provide the stron-
gest justification possible for interventions that sacrifice important individual inter-
ests. The justification would be stronger if, in addition to considerations of public 
interest, there were independent individual moral obligations to make those indi-
vidual sacrifices that are required by the restrictive policy (Giubilini et al. 2018) 
Thus, one way to strengthen the justification for state interventions such as taxation 
of antimicrobials or prohibition of certain antimicrobial uses is to identify a pre- 
existing individual moral obligation not to use antimicrobials in certain cases. Such 
independent moral obligation to prioritize other-regarding choices over self- 
interested choices would make the case for introducing restrictive policies that limit 
or discourage antimicrobial use as compelling as possible: such policies would sim-
ply impose or encourage choices that individuals have an independent moral obliga-
tion to make anyway.
9.4  Individual Responsibility and Duty of Easy Rescue: 
The Ethical Solution to the Tragedy of the Commons 
and the Responsibilities of the State
We have noted above that, as Hardin himself acknowledged, the tragedy of the com-
mons is first and foremost an ethical problem. Therefore, it has an ethical solution 
that is independent from the justification for legislative coercive solutions. Now, 
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“ethical solution” means, according to Hardin’s phrasing, a change in “human val-
ues” informing human behaviour. Thus, in the case of antimicrobial consumption, 
the ethical solution to the tragedy of the commons consists in justifying the exis-
tence of an individual moral obligation to act contrary to one’s (short term) self 
interest in order to contribute to the preservation of the common good of antimicro-
bial effectiveness. In other words, the ethical solution consists in finding a justifica-
tion for a moral duty not to use antimicrobials, if necessary even at the cost of 
leaving some infections untreated, in order to protect the common good of antimi-
crobial effectiveness. In this section we are going to provide this justification.
It is plausible to assume that individuals have what might be called a “duty of 
easy rescue” (Savulescu 2007). That is, if doing X (or refraining from doing Y) 
entails a small cost to an individual and a large benefit (or prevention of a large 
harm) to others, the individual has a clear prima facie moral obligation to do X (or 
to refrain from doing Y). Morality is essentially different from prudence, and 
requires the sacrifice of one’s own interests for others. It is debatable what kind of 
individual sacrifices morality requires, but if morality requires anything, almost 
everyone would agree that it certainly requires at least small sacrifices for the sake 
of preventing great harm. This does not mean that an individual does not have a 
moral obligation when the cost to her is not small. However, in easy rescue case, 
such moral obligation seems uncontroversial. A formulation of the duty of easy 
rescue was famously provided by Peter Singer, according to whom “if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing any-
thing of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 1972, 
p. 230, emphasis added). A roughly equivalent, though way less demanding, formu-
lation has been provided by Tim Scanlon, according to whom “[i]f we can prevent 
something very bad from happening to someone by making a slight or even moder-
ate sacrifice, it would be wrong not to do so” (Scanlon 1998, p. 224). The fact that 
some version of a duty of easy rescue can be defended both from a utilitarian per-
spective- in the case of Singer  – and a contractualist perspective- in the case of 
Scanlon  – supports the idea that it is a fundamental requirement of morality on 
which reasonable people could agree.
The existence of a duty of easy rescue implies an individual moral obligation to 
forgo antimicrobials for the sake of the common good of antimicrobial effective-
ness, when forgoing antimicrobials comes at a sufficiently small cost to individuals. 
This would be the case, for example, when antimicrobials are not necessary to treat 
an infection (for example in the case of viral infections), in which case there would 
be no cost at all in forgoing antimicrobials. But forgoing antimicrobials would also 
come at a relatively small cost to individuals when individuals have minor self- 
limiting infections or low risk mild infections (for example, skin infections which 
could be treated topically with antiseptics) that do not significantly worsen the gen-
eral state of health of the individual, where the risks of complications is adequately 
monitored, and when the individual is adequately compensated for any financial and 
non-financial cost she might incur as a consequence of leaving that infection 
untreated. As some have suggested (Foster and Grundmann 2006) it might at some 
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point be necessary to leave such self-limiting infections untreated in order to pre-
serve antimicrobial effectiveness.
The moral duty of easy rescue represents the ethical solution to the tragedy of the 
commons in the context of antimicrobial consumption that Hardin advocated: indi-
viduals have a moral obligation to prioritize the public interest in the preservation of 
the commons of antimicrobial effectiveness over their own interest in treating with 
antimicrobials any type of infection (including mild and self-limiting ones), because 
doing so comes at a small cost to individuals, at least when all that is required of 
individuals is to leave self-limiting mild or minor infections untreated in circum-
stances in which this would not significantly worsen individual health and where 
adequate compensatory measures are in place.
Now, since it is necessary that a large number of individuals fulfil a duty of easy 
rescue in order for a public benefit to obtain, we can say that there is not only an 
individual, but also a collective responsibility to forgo antimicrobials when doing so 
is a way of fulfilling a duty of easy rescue. Now, in some cases of collective action, 
any individual contribution to a collective good, or to the prevention of a collective 
harm, is insignificant; for example, the contribution each individual could make to 
the realisation of herd immunity through individual vaccination, or the contribution 
each individual could make to the prevention of global warming by avoiding driving 
just for fun, are both negligible. However, in the case of containment of antimicro-
bial resistance every single individual forgoing antimicrobials could make a differ-
ence, because every single individual could become the carrier of resistant microbes 
that are then passed onto other people. For example, it has been shown that individu-
als who take antibiotics for respiratory and urinary infections might develop bacte-
rial resistance that could last up to 12 months (Costelloe et al. 2010). Thus, the need 
to preserve the common good of antimicrobial effectiveness implies not only a col-
lective responsibility, but also an individual responsibility not to use antimicrobials 
so as to benefit others by contributing to the preservation of antimicrobial effective-
ness, at least as long as forgoing antimicrobials comes at a small enough cost to 
individuals.
When forgoing antimicrobials is a moral duty of easy rescue, we can claim that 
the state is in the position to fulfil its obligation to provide the strongest justification 
possible for prohibiting or at least discouraging the use of antimicrobials: as we said 
in Sect. 9.3, the state would be discouraging or preventing individuals from doing 
only what they have a moral obligation not to do anyway. Therefore, being the state 
in the position to fulfil its moral obligations in implementing restrictive measures, 
such restrictive measures regarding antimicrobial use are ethically justified. As one 
of us put it, “when the cost to us of forgoing some activity is small (…) and the harm 
to others which thereby does not occur is great (prevention of serious disease), then 
liberals might require that the state prevent this harm” (Savulescu 2007, p. 10).
“Duty to rescue” laws exist in many European countries; for instance, in Germany 
and France it is illegal not to assist a person in danger when providing assistance 
entails a small or no risk to the potential rescuer. From what we have said so far, 
laws restricting antimicrobial use could be ethically justified as special cases of 
“duty to rescue” laws of this kind.
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The individual moral responsibility to forgo antimicrobials in certain circum-
stances implies that there are two other actors with specific moral responsibilities, 
besides patients with minor or mild self-limiting infections.
First, doctors have the responsibility to assess whether a certain infection is self- 
limiting and, more in general, whether leaving a certain infection untreated is com-
patible with a good enough level of individual health. In one important sense, the 
fact that the state has the strongest justification possible for imposing bans on anti-
microbial use or for discouraging through taxation antimicrobial consumption takes 
the responsibility for decisions about antimicrobial prescription out of the hands of 
doctors: if a certain infection is mild and self limiting and leaving it untreated does 
not significantly worsen the general state of health of the patient, then the state, 
rather than the doctor, is justified in preventing the use of antimicrobials for the sake 
of the common good. However, the doctors would still have the important responsi-
bility of determining whether the conditions specified in such laws would apply, and 
thus they would still be the ultimate gate-keepers of antimicrobials.
Second, but equally important, healthcare systems and states have important 
moral responsibilities too. We have said that having an uncontroversial individual 
moral obligation based on a duty of easy rescue to sometimes forgo antimicrobials 
strengthens the justification for state interventions that forbid or discourage antimi-
crobial use. Therefore, the state or the healthcare system have the responsibility to 
ensure that forgoing antimicrobials does represent a form of easy rescue, i.e. that it 
is not too burdensome for patients, so that the justification for state intervention is 
the strongest possible. This means, at the very least, that patients who are denied 
antimicrobials should be carefully monitored and provided with adequate and 
enhanced medical follow up to make sure that forgoing antimicrobial treatment 
does not significantly worsen the general state of health of the individual. It is the 
responsibility of states and of healthcare systems to ensure that adequate measures 
are in place in order to guarantee monitoring and medical supervisions of those 
patients who sacrifice their self-interest for the sake of the collective good, so that 
their sacrifice would represent a form of easy rescue.
However, we claim that the responsibility of states extends beyond the provision 
of medical supervision and follow up. We propose that a further measure that might 
be implemented in order to ensure that the rescue is an easy rescue is that of com-
pensating individuals who make a sacrifice for the sake of the collective good. 
Compensation  – financial or of other kind  – would be an appropriate measure 
because it would provide individuals with an additional reason for forgoing antimi-
crobials in certain circumstances, it would be fair in consideration of the sacrifice 
individuals are making for the sake of the collective good, and, more importantly, if 
the right type of compensation is offered, it could make their condition easier to 
bear, thus approximating a form of easy rescue and providing a further reason for 
the existence of an individual ethical obligation. For example, those who forgo anti-
microbials and leave infections untreated could be offered first call on future medi-
cal treatments, even for conditions that are not related to the current infection; or 
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they might be offered discounts when they buy other medicines, such as painkillers, 
or discounts on future medical treatments; alternatively, they might be offered out-
right financial compensation, for example in the form of tax relief or by directly 
paying them, which would account for any financial loss that might result from 
enduring a prolonged infections. In this way, they would derive at least some benefit 
from the sacrifice they are making, which would render the sacrifice easier to bear, 
and at the same time society would be “making up” for the sacrifice it is imposing 
on these individuals.
Granted, preserving antimicrobial effectiveness by financially compensating 
those who forgo antimicrobials might involve a significant cost for the state. 
However, we saw in the introduction that there will be significant costs associated 
with AMR if we don’t intervene now; therefore, investing money now to compen-
sate and to guarantee adequate medical follow up to those who make sacrifices in 
order to contain AMR might be a good strategy also from the point of view of 
cost-effectiveness.
9.5  Conclusions
When is it necessary to leave infections untreated in order to preserve the common 
good of antimicrobial effectiveness? This is an empirical issue and the answer 
depends on whether and to what extent the societal optimum of antimicrobial con-
sumption differs from the individual optimum. In other words, it concerns the issue 
whether and to what extent the level of individual consumption that is consistent 
with satisfactory AMR containment (the societal optimum) differs from the level of 
consumption that would effectively treat infections in any individual (the individual 
optimum). As Kevin Foster and Hajo Grundmann (2006, pp. 178–9) have explained, 
if individual and societal optima were similar, it would be sufficient to avoid inap-
propriate antimicrobial use, such as using antibiotics in the case of viral infections, 
an abuse which often occurs (Van der Velden et al. 2013). Only inappropriate use of 
antimicrobials would then be morally impermissible. However, if individuals and 
societal optimum differed significantly, in order to protect the societal interest in 
AMR containment individuals might be required to leave minor and mild self- 
limiting infections untreated in order to reserve antimicrobials for serious major 
infections. In such cases, coercive policies that restrict access to some therapeuti-
cally justified use of antimicrobials are ethically permissible, or so we have argued. 
However, when implementing such restrictive policies, state and health authorities 
have responsibilities not only towards the collective, but also towards individuals 
who make (small) sacrifices for the sake of the collective interested, and who should 
be guaranteed adequate compensation in exchange for leaving certain infections 
untreated.
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